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APPELLANTS'REPLY
1. The grounds upon which the district court granted summary iudgment was not

an issue raised bv the moving party.

It is undisputed that the district judge granted summary judgment on the grounds
that no contract was formed because AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the
Modification Agreement to the Hafers. That specific issue - whether AHMSI returned a
signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers, and/or whether AHMSI's failure to return
the signed agreement precluded contract formation - was not before the court.
AHMSI argued on summary judgment that there was no enforceable contract
based on two grounds: (1) the first Modification Agreement AHMSI sent to the Hafers
was not properly notarized by the Hafers, and; (2) the second Modification Agreement
AHMSI sent to the Hafers was not returned by the Hafers until after the stated deadline.
R. p. 79. Nowhere in respondents' motion for summary judgment is there an argument
that a valid, enforceable agreement to modify the Hafers loan did not exists between the
Hafers and AHMSI because AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the Modification
Agreement to the Hafers. Therefore, there is no colorable argument that AHMSI can
make that the basis, or grounds, upon which the district court granted summary judgment
- that AHMSI did not return a signed copy of the Modification Agreement - was raised
by respondents' in their motion for summary judgment.
It is well established law in Idaho that the party against whom summary judgment

will be entered must be given adequate advance notice and an opportunity to demonstrate
why summary judgment should not be entered. Idaho Endowment Fund Inv. Board v.
Crane, 135 Idaho 667, 671 (2001). Furthermore, on a motion for summary judgment a
district court may not decide an issue not raised in the moving party's motion for

summary judgment. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527 (1994).

In

Thomson the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that a non-moving party is not

required to respond to issues not raised by the moving paiiy even if the non-moving party
ultimately has the burden of proof at trial.
The Hafers did not have an opportunity to respond to, or contest, the issue of
whether AHMSI returned a signed copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers, or
whether AHMSI had to return a signed copy before the agreement to modify the loan
would be enforceable.

Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary

judgment to AHMSI.
AHMSI' s opposition is nothing more than an untutored attempt at misdirection
and sleight of hand. AHMSI contends the issue before the district court was "whether an
enforceable agreement to modify the Hafers' loan existed." OPP Brief p. 7 There are
myriad of issues, and/or elements, to consider in determining whether an enforceable
contract exists, including but not limited: capacity, offer, definite terms, acceptance,
duress, fraud, mistake, impossibility, illusory promise and mutual assent. No matter how
AHMSI couches the "issue", the undisputed facts are clear: (1) the court granted
summary judgment on the grounds that AHMSI did not return a signed Modification
Agreement to the Hafers; (2) respondents did not argue in their motion for summary
judgment that an enforceable contract did not exist because AHMSI did not return a
signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers. The basis upon which the district court
granted summary judgment was not an issue raised in the pleadings. It was therefore
improper for the district court to grant summary judgment.
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AHMSI argues that because the court was addressing the general issue of contract
formation, it had the latitude to rule on the issue of formation based on any grounds,
rather or not raised in the motion. AHMSI's argument is akin to the argument that if a
moving party raises the issue of negligence then the court could properly grant summary
judgment based on any element of negligence whether or not raised in the pleadings.
Such is clearly not the case. In Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527 (1994) the
defendant moved for summary judgment on a negligence cause of action based on the
argument that it did not owe plaintiff a duty. The district court found there were issues of
fact that precluded summary judgment on the issue of duty, but granted summary
judgment based on lack of evidence of proximate cause. The Supreme Court overturned
the grant of summary judgment because the defendant had not raised the issue of
proximate cause in its motion, stating "if the movant does not challenge an aspect of the
nonmovant's case in that party's motion, the nonmovant is not required to address it at the
summary judgment stage of the proceedings." Id. at 531.
Similarly, in Sales v. Peabody, No 41446, 2014 WL 4656522 (Idaho, Sept. 19,
2014) this court held that summary judgment cannot be granted on issues not raised in the
pleadings. In Sales the defendant moved for summary judgment on a negligence claim
on the grounds that plaintiff could not establish duty or causation. The district court
granted summary judgment based on the finding that a certain fact contained in the
pleadings was a superseding cause of the injury.

This court stated that of summary

judgment could not be granted on the "superseding cause" theory because it was not
raised by the moving party.
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Similar to the Sales case, the district court in the case at bar latched onto a fact
that had no apparent relevance to any issue or theory presented in the moving the papers,
and granted summary judgment on an issue not raised in the moving papers.
Accordingly, it was improper for the district court to grant summary judgment in this
case.
Respondents argue for the first time on appeal that a valid contract to modify the
loan did not exist between the Hafers and AHMSI because AHMSI did not sign the
Modification Agreement.

Respondents inaccurately state that it is "undisputed" that

AHMSI did not return a signed Modification Agreement to the Hafers. To the contrary,
it is neither disputed nor undisputed. It is in fact not an issue at all, because respondents
did not raise it as an issue in the pleadings.
Respondents' new argument that AHMSI had to sign and return the modification
agreement is based on the Court's decision in Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v.
Louisiana Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233 (2001) ("Intermountain Forest"). It is telling that
respondents utterly fail to set forth the facts in Intermountain Forest, or how the facts are
comparable to the case at bar.

The obvious reason for the dearth of information in

respondents' brief is because the decision of Intermountain Forest is distinguishable on
the facts, and is neither controlling nor informative.
In Intermountain Forest Gary Briggs, the president of Intermountain Forest
Management ("IFM") made an offer to Laurie Stone, and employee of Louisiana Pacific
Corp. ("L-P") with whom IFM had worked on a logging project, to have L-P complete a
logging project on another tract of land. Stone prepared a contract based on the offer
made my IFM. Briggs signed the contract on behalf of IFM. In his deposition Briggs
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admitted he was aware Stone had no authority to bind L-P on the contract, the contract
was unsinged at the time Briggs signed it, and Stone told Briggs she had to take the
contract back to L-P for a signature.
The court held "The undisputed facts in the record reasonably support the district
judge's conclusion that the presentation of the contract to Briggs for a signature was not
an offer and Briggs was not justified in assuming his assent would conclude the bargain,
... " Id at 23 7.
The facts of Intermountain Forest, are substantially different than the facts of the
case at bar in many significant aspects. First, the issue of AHMSI' s signature on the
contract was not raised in the summary judgment motion. Second, the Hafers did not
make the offer to AHMSI, AHMSI made the offer to the Hafers. Third, based on the
language of the TPP Mr. Hafer is justified in his understanding that by accepting the
offer, by making his TPP payments, the loan would be modified. 1 "An offer 'is a
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person
in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.'
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS" Id. at 237. Finally, it is undisputed that
Mr. Hafer timely made his TPP payments. R. p. 45. Mr. Hafer then signed, notarized and
returned the Modification Agreement to the AHMSI.

1 The

AHMSI's argument that no

Trial Period Plan specifically provides:
Congratulations! You are approved to enter into a trial period plan under the Home Affordable
Modification Program.
To accept this offer, you must make your first monthly "trial period payment." To qualify for a
permanent modification, you must make the following trial period payments in a timely manner:
[April, May and June]. After all trial period payments are timely made and you have submitted all
the required documents, your mortgage will be permanently modified. R. p. 49
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contract is formed until it returns a signed copy of the modification agreement "turns an
otherwise straight forward offer into an illusion." Wigod at 884.
2. AMSJ's

signing and returning
unenforceable condition precedent.

the

lvlodification

Agreement

is an

As set forth in the appellants' opening brief, the requirement that AHMSI sign
and return a copy of the Modification Agreement to the Hafers is an unenforceable
condition precedent.

AHMSI argues that its duty, if any, to sign the modification

agreement was premised on Mr. Hafer properly accepting the Modification Agreement
and returning it to AHMSI by the stated deadline. Contrary to AHMSI's contentions,
AHMSI's duty to provide Mr. Hafer with a signed modification agreement arose once
Mr. Hafer made his third timely TPP payment. However, even assuming AHMSI's duty
to provide a singed modification agreement did not arise until Mr. Hafer properly
accepted the modification agreement, the summary judgment pleadings clearly establish
that there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hafer "properly"
accepted and returned the Modification Agreement.
3. The foreclosure sale is void i(there was not default.

AHMSI offers no opposition to the argument that if the Hafers had an agreement
with AHMSI then they were not in default and foreclosure sale is void. As set forth in
appellants' opening brief, material questions of fact exist which preclude summary
judgment on the issue of contract formation. It is undisputed that the Hafers complied
with the terms of the TPP. The weight of legal authority and precedent establishes that
when the borrower complies with the terms of a TPP the lender must present borrower
with a signed permanent modification agreement. Giving the lender unfettered discretion
of whether to provide the borrower with a signed modification agreement after the
6

borrower has fulfilled his obligations of the TPP turns an otherwise straight forward
promise into an illusion.

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully request that his court reverse the District Court's decision
on respondents' motion for summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted this lih day of November, 2014.
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